以下係ＢＨ１９８２年ｌｅｔｔｅｒ ｔｏ ｓｈａｒｅｈｏｌｄｅｒ節錄：
Why, then, was underwriting, despite the existence of
cycles, generally profitable over many decades? (From 1950
through 1970, the industry combined ratio averaged 99.0.
allowing all investment income plus 1% of premiums to flow
through to profits.) The answer lies primarily in the historic
methods of regulation and distribution. For much of this
century, a large portion of the industry worked, in effect,
within a legal quasi-administered pricing system fostered by
insurance regulators. While price competition existed, it was
not pervasive among the larger companies. The main competition
was for agents, who were courted via various non-price-related
strategies.
For the giants of the industry, most rates were set through
negotiations between industry “bureaus” (or through companies
acting in accord with their recommendations) and state
regulators. Dignified haggling occurred, but it was between
company and regulator rather than between company and customer.
When the dust settled, Giant A charged the same price as Giant B
- and both companies and agents were prohibited by law from
cutting such filed rates.
The company-state negotiated prices included specific profit
allowances and, when loss data indicated that current prices were
unprofitable, both company managements and state regulators
expected that they would act together to correct the situation.
Thus, most of the pricing actions of the giants of the industry
were “gentlemanly”, predictable, and profit-producing. Of prime
importance - and in contrast to the way most of the business
world operated - insurance companies could legally price their
way to profitability even in the face of substantial over-
capacity.
为什么保险业即使在面临这种情况下(在1950年到1970年间产业平均的Combined Ratio为99.0)，数十年来仍能有所获利?
使得公司获利除投资收益外，还外加1%的承销利益，答案在于传统的规范与行销方式，这个世纪以来整个产业系依照业者所掌控的近乎法定管制价格机制在运作，虽然竞价行为确实存在，但在大型保险业间却不普遍，主要的竞争系在争取经纪人方面，且多用各种与价格无关的方式去争取。
而大型业者的费率主要系透过产业公会与州政府管制当局协调(或依照公司所建议)来订定，讨价还价是难免的，但那是业者与政府间，而不是业者与客户间的行为。
当争论结束，公司甲的价格可能与公司乙的完全一致，而法律也禁止业者或经纪人再杀价竞争。
业者与州政府协议订定的价格保障业者的获利而当资料显示现有价格不敷成本时，政府还会与业者协调共同努力改善损失的状况，故产业大部份定价的举动皆能确保公司有利可图，最重要的是不同于一般商业社会运作的习惯，保险公司即使在超额供给的情况下，仍能合法地调整价格以确保公司的获利。
而１９８１年則有提及：
Thus, this year's sales contracts ("premium written" in the parlance of the industry) determine about one-half of next year's level of revenue ("premiums earned"). The remaining half will be determined by sales contracts written next year that will be about 50% earned in that year. The profitability consequences are automatic: if you make a mistake in pricing, you have to live with it for an uncomfortable period of time.
今年销售合约(业内说法，称之为保费收入)决定了明年保费收入水准的半数，至于另外一半则由明年签下的保险契约来决定，因此获利情况自然而然会递延，也就是说若你在订价上犯了错误，那你所受痛苦可能会持续一阵子。
Note in the table below the year-over-year gain in industry-wide premiums written and the impact that it has on the current and following year's level of underwriting profitability. The result is exactly as you would expect in an inflationary world. When the volume gain is well up in double digits, it bodes well for profitability trends in the current and following year. When the industry volume gain is small, underwriting experience very shortly will get worse, no matter how unsatisfactory the current level.
注意每年保费收入成长率以及其对当年与隔年度获利影响，而结果正如同你在通胀高涨时所预期一样，当保费收入以二位数成长，则当年与隔年获利数字就会很好看，但若保费收入仅能以个位数成长，则表示承保结果就会变得很差。
雖然巴老所講既係美國８０年代之情況，但仍能歷久常新，放之於現今中國亦可
係１９８２年，巴老還講後來保險業發展情況，我想這情況應不會在中國發生，但你有興趣的話可以自己睇下
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